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Abstract—The threats of caching poisoning attacks largely
stimulate the deployment of DNSSEC. Being a strong but
demanding cryptographical defense, DNSSEC has its universal
adoption predicted to go through a lengthy transition. Thus
the DNSSEC practitioners call for a secure yet lightweight
solution to speed up DNSSEC deployment while offering an
acceptable DNSSEC-like defense. This paper proposes a new
defense against cache poisoning attacks, still using but lightly
using DNSSEC. In the solution, DNS operates in the DNSSEC-
oblivious mode unless a potential attack is detected and triggers
a switch to the DNSSEC-aware mode. The performance of the
defense is analyzed and validated. The modeling checking results
demonstrate that only a small DNSSEC query load is needed to
ensure a small enough cache poisoning success rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Domain Name System (DNS) is today’s largest name
resolution system in use. Most of Internet applications rely on
DNS to translate human friendly names to addresses, services,
servers, etc. However, the early design of DNS did not pay
sufficient attention to its security in 1980s. Thus the emerging
security problems of DNS drove the community’s efforts on
developing DNS security mechanisms. One major progress
on securing DNS is DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [1]
as a set of specifications agreed by IETF in 2005. DNSSEC
provides security capabilities by digitally signing DNS data
using public-key cryptography.
Largely due to its enormous costs in technology, policy,
management, the value of the DNSSEC effort is debatable over
years before 2008. Some temporary mitigating solutions were
proposed in those years in a hope to exempt the DNS from
the heavyweight DNSSEC. However, the discovery of Kamin-
sky vulnerabilities [2] ended the debate since no lightweight
mitigating solutions convincingly secure the DNS from the
Kaminsky attacks. Until then, the DNS community finally
reached a consensus that DNSSEC should roll out as a global
Internet infrastructure upgrade.
The Internet-scale DNSSEC deployment requires substan-
tial costs, efforts, coordination, and time. In the measurements
of the cost of DNSSEC deployment [3], both cache resolver
and authoritative name server are demonstrated to suffer sig-
nificant performance penalty when turning on DNSSEC. As a
large-scale cryptographic system, DNSSEC heavily relies on
the secure key generation, storage, distribution and rollover
as well as zone signing and record authentication opera-
tions. Another important and indispensable aspect that may
be underestimated is the changing and increasing operational
procedures and policies that may materially affect the life cycle
of the DNS data. Hence despite that the DNS community
has been sparing no efforts to use its resources to encourage
DNS registries, ISPs and enterprises to upgrade to DNSSEC,
global DNSSEC deployment is still very far from completion.
While the root and most top-level domains have rolled out
DNSSEC, the rare adoption on lower level domains, which
are mostly the ultimate destination of individual DNS lookups,
might shed light on a low level of optimism on the universal
DNSSEC adoption as a whole. In some ways, the progress
of DNSSEC deployment is similar to the undergoing IPv4 to
IPv6 transition: slow and incremental.
The growing threats to DNS in recent years propel the
efforts of speeding up DNSSEC deployment. This is be-
cause DNSSEC deployment is much like an “all or nothing”
proposition. In other words, incomplete or halfway DNSSEC
deployment is likely to leave a much larger subset of the
entire domain name space vulnerable than we may expect. The
strong defense against Kaminsky attacks provided by DNSSEC
virtually takes effects only when DNSSEC is fully deployed
across the Internet – from the DNS root zone at the top of the
DNS hierarchy down to individual top-level domains (such as
.com and .net), second-level domains, lower level domains,
and even leaf domains in the DNS tree. Not only the target
domain itself but also all its ancestor domains (including the
parent domain) must be signed to ensure a complete trust chain
to get protected by DNSSEC. Otherwise if only any domain
in the trust chain turns DNSSEC oblivious, the target domain
turns vulnerable to Kaminsky attacks.
To shorten the transition to DNSSEC, one effective way
is to lower the costs of DNSSEC while retaining the compa-
rable security capability of DNSSEC. The transition solution
should also be able to readlily upgrade to the full DNSSEC
whenever necessary or the transition is to be finished. This
paper proposes TDWN (Take up DNSSEC When Needed), a
lightweight defense against cache poisoning attacks. TDWN
changes DNSSEC operation from the model of persistent-
defense to a model of detect-and-defense. Hence DNSSEC
can be expected to be not so aggressively used and the vast
costs wasted by DNSSEC in the absence of attacks are saved.
TDWN makes full use of the detection capability of recursive
resolvers to take up DNSSEC whenever needed so that clients
can be kept transparent to the defense. Because of its efficiency
and efficacy, TDWN can serve as an interim or transition
mechanism for spreading and speeding DNSSEC adoption over
a long-term transition.
II. RELATED WORK
As a non-DNSSEC solution to the DNS security, Fan et
al. [4] proposed prevention schemes embedded in so-called
security proxy. But their deployment costs are fairly high be-
cause security proxies need to be deployed at both authoritative
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Fig. 1: DNSSEC-aware mode.
servers and recursive resolvers to support packing and unpack-
ing of all DNS packets with security label. Schomp et al. [5]
proposed a radical change to the existing DNS eco-system
for tackling vulnerabilities in shared DNS resolvers: removing
shared DNS resolvers entirely and leaving recursive resolution
to the clients. However, each individual client conducting its
own resolutions may be still targeted by cache poisoning
attackers. The solution also has a large performance penalty
because the wide-area DNS traffic and DNS server load will
grow significantly due to the absence of cache sharing. Sun et
al. [6] proposed DepenDNS as a countermeasure which query
multiple resolvers concurrently to verify a trustworthy answer.
The reliability and availability of history response data used
by DepenDNS is a great concern. Besides, the performance
concern about DepenDNS is when the queries are multiplied,
their processing overheads will also be multiplied. Shulman
et al. [7] performed a critical study of the prominent defense
mechanisms against poisoning attacks by off-path adversaries,
concluding that existing ‘easy-to-deploy’ defenses are not so
reliable and thus transition to DNSSEC deserves the efforts.
Our proposal has an advantage of providing a strong defense
comparable to DNSSEC while lowering the cost to a low as
some challenge-response defenses.
III. THE PROPOSED DEFENSE
To “condense” DNSSEC as best as possible while retaining
its security capability against cache poisoning attacks, we
propose that DNSSEC can coalesce with attack detection to
lower its overheads.
A. Attack Detection
Cache poisoning is where the attacker manages to inject
bogus data into a resolver’s cache with carefully crafted and
timed DNS packets. A cache poisoned resolver will response
with its wrongfully accepted and cached data, make its clients
contact the wrong and possibly malicious servers. For the
sake of being accepted by the target resolver, cache poisoning
attackers have to guess the transaction ID, port number,
and source address of the genuine response in their bogus
responses. A number of bogus responses of wrong guessing
are expected to be found by the target resolver before one
bogus response may accidentally succeed. So failure response
counting can be utilized to detect possible cache poisoning
attacks. For one DNS question, a failure response is defined as
the response mismatching the combination of transaction ID,
port number, and source address against its outstanding (wait-
for-response) request. In particular, a failure response attempt
satisfies: a): It matches the DNS question (or precisely the
triple < qname, qtype, qclass >) of the outstanding queri(es).
Note that attackers may exploit multiple outstanding queries
for the same question to significantly increase the success rate
of caching poisoning. This is referred to as “birthday attack”.
In that case, more than one outstanding queries may share
one question. b): If a) holds, it mismatches at least one item
among transaction ID, port number, and source address of the
outstanding queri(es).
As a means of attack detection, the resolver counts the
incoming failure responses for the DNS question of the out-
standing queri(es) until the count amounts to a threshold of
defense (ToD). Then the alert and the corresponding response
to attack is triggered. The appropriate setting of ToD should
consider: on one hand, a too large value will result in a non-
negligible increase of cache poisoning success rate ahead of
any defense in place, e.g., the number of forgery responses
is in the order of ten thousands to ensure a 50% chance of
compromise in most cases of DNS operations citeZ1,citeZ2;
on the other hand, a too small value will too readily trigger
the defense. Problem of false positive stands here when non-
malicious but negligent users may unintentionally create a
small amount of malformed responses which are identified
as failure responses. Another exploit of a small threshold is
that adversaries may intentionally feed a few failure responses
on the target resolver in a bid to overload it with excessive
defenses.
B. The Two Modes
1) DNSSEC-Oblivious Mode: In the DNSSEC-oblivious
mode, the recursive resolver operates in compliant with the
conventional DNS. That is, it never sends DNSSEC requests or
authenticate DNSSEC response unless it is explicitly required
by the client (which sets the DO bit in the request). In handling
a response, the recursive resolver simply checks and accepts
that response if it successfully matches the outstanding query.
In comparison with the conventional DNS, the DNSSEC-
oblivious mode supplements the attack detection stated above
and thereby the transition to the DNSSEC-aware mode once at-
tack is detected. Therefore the costs of the DNSSEC-oblivious
mode are almost as low as the conventional DNS. As long as
no attack is detected, the DNSSEC-oblivious mode continues
as a normalcy.
2) DNSSEC-Aware Mode: When resolving a DNS ques-
tion, the resolver transitions from the DNSSEC-oblivious mode
to the DNSSEC-aware mode when that question is hit by at
least ToD failure responses counted in the attack detection. The
DNSSEC-aware mode uses DNSSEC transactions to validate
suspicious responses to the DNS question potentially targeted
by attackers.
The responding process in the DNSSEC-aware mode is
illustrated in Fig. 1. When a DNS question is labeled as
suspicious by the attack detection, the resolver should im-
mediately initiate a separate DNSSEC-aware request for that
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Fig. 2: An example of the integration of the two modes.
question. Once validated by the validators, the response, which
is called “validating response” hereinafter, is designated as
the trustworthy authority for all upcoming responses to that
question. Thus all responses arriving prior to the validating
response are simply hold on rather than accepted. Note that
the hold-on responses may include one bogus response, which
may otherwise look as genuine because it completely matches
the oustanding query (but, of course, not validated through
DNSSEC). The genuine response is also likely to be hold on
if it arrives earlier than the validating response.
The validating response, if validated through DNSSEC, is
deemed as trustworthy. It is compared against each response
in the hold-on list. If there is any hold-on response matching
the validating response, the resolution transaction ends with
returning the matching response to the client and discarding
other hold-on responses if any. Otherwise, if no candidate
hold-on response survives the matching check, all existing
candidates in hand will be discarded and the resolver will
continue to wait for more candidate responses probably still
to come until the resolution transaction times out. Then each
newly arrived responses, if any, will be likewise checked
against the validating response before it can be accepted and
returned. In summary, the DNSSEC-aware mode attempts to
return the first candidate response matching the validating
response until the resolution transaction times out.
3) Integration of the Two Modes: We present in detail how
the two modes are integrated to defend against cache poisoning
attacks. In particular, our example in Fig. 2 shows the defense
procedure under the most mighty version of Kaminsky class
attacks: (1): The attacker’s client sends the target resolver
a query for the IP address of “asq50pn.foo.com” below the
target domain “foo.com”. The domain “asq50pn.foo.com” is
delicately crafted with random characaters so that it is likely to
miss the resolver’s cache to trigger an outstanding query. (2a):
The forgery authoritative server tries to send cache poisoning
attempts to the target resolver guessing the transaction ID, etc.
of the genius response until the failure responses accumulate
to ToD. Each failure response may, e.g., guess a wrong
transaction ID, and intends to inject the IP address of the
forgery authoritative server, say “Y.Y.Y.Y”. (2b): Roughly in
parallel with (2a), the target resolver sends requests to the real
authoritative name servers for “asq50pn.foo.com”. (3a): When
the attack detection counts the number of failure responses
to ToD, the target resolver starts the DNSSEC-aware mode
by sending a DNSSEC-aware query for “asq50pn.foo.com”
soliciting a validating response. (3b): Perhaps at the same
time as (3a), the genius response arrives at the target resolver
informing the IP address of the real authoritative server, say
“X.X.X.X”. However, as the DNSSEC-aware mode is already
turned on, the response is hold on rather than simply accepted.
(3c): The target resolver may still persistently be fed with
cache poisoning responses after the ToD failure responses trig-
gers the DNSSEC-aware mode. Before the validation response
is returned, the continuous response guessing efforts do have
a chance of success. The successful guessing response is also
hold on for the future validation. (4): When the validating
response is obtained by the target resolver, the relevant records
in the validating response are subject to DNSSEC validation
using the verified public key. That DNSSEC validation may
render further DNSSEC transactions such as step (5) and (6)
because some signatures (RRSIG records) over the interested
data may be absent from the original validating response. (5):
The target resolver initiates a new DNSSEC transaction to val-
idate the IP address of the authoritative server (“ns.foo.com”).
(6): The new validating response contains a RRSIG record
over the A type (IP address) record of “ns.foo.com”. By then,
the validating response can be validated. (7): By checking the
hold-on list against the validating response, the IP address of
“ns.foo.com”, namely “X.X.X.X”, is identified as genius and
“Y.Y.Y.Y” as bogus. The validated record can thus be used by
the target resolver in the final answer as well as in the cache.
C. Aggressive Use of Validating Response
1) Efficiency and Security Concerns on the One-Time Use
of Validating Response: As discussed above, the validating
response is introduced to defeat the cache poisoning attempt
within the resolution transaction of a single query name.
However, a validating response is underutilized if it is used
only for a single query name, since some data may be shared
among different query names. In the example of Fig. 2, the
attacker may initiate a query for a new name other than
“asq50pn.foo.com”, say “b3rr5v.foo.com”, immediately after
he receives a genius response (indicating cache poisoning
failure) rather than his intended bogus response (indicating
cache poisoning success). Because the two query names fall
into the same domain “foo.com”, the data flows of the two
defenses almost overlap except for where the query name
“asq50pn.foo.com” is replaced with “b3rr5v.foo.com”. But
with the one-time use validating response, the resolver need
at least two seperate DNSSEC transactions for the two query
names respectively. When successive cache poisoning attacks
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Fig. 3: Aggressive use of validating response.
are launched using random generated query names within the
same target domain, the resolver would waste a great number
of DNSSEC transactions on the largely overlapping data. So
the one-time use of validating response is sub-optimal in terms
of efficiency.
Being a reasonably small value, ToD still allows for a
minor enough chance of caching poisoning success within one
window of the TDWN transaction, since the defense leaves
the initial ToD-1 caching poisoning attempts free of being
detected and validated. While that threat is negligible for a
short window, it may grow to serious when the brute force
response guessing attack is rapid and continuous for a long
window. This is because the success rate of caching poisoning
increase dramatically with the number of cache poisoning
attempts. The one-time use validating response only defeats
the ToD th caching poisoning attempt and its successors within
one TDWN transaction, but it virtually does nothing to defend
against the initial ToD-1 caching poisoning attempts in the next
TDWN transaction. So the one-time use of validating response
weakens the TDWN in terms of security.
Based on the above analysis, the underutilized validating
response raises not only efficiency concerns but also security
concerns. In order to maximize the utilization of validating
response and minimize the cache poisoning opportunities, we
propose to retain validating responses in cache for a long-lived
defense rather than just use them once.
2) Caching of Validating Response: The signed records
contained in the validating responses and validated by the
recursive resolver should be regarded as more trustworthy than
the unsigned records in the valid normal responses. Similar
to the conventional DNS caching, those records are cached
by the recursive resolver for a period to validate the normal
responses. Nevertheless, the caching of validating responses
differs from the conventional DNS caching in the following:
a) The validating records are given a priority over the unsigned
normal records and they are stored in a priority cache other
than a normal cache. Here “priority” means: a record in the
priority cache can overwrite its unsigned counterparts in the
normal cache if they conflict with each other; a record in the
priority cache cannot be overwritten by any unsigned record
in the more recent normal response; the life cycle of any
record in the priority cache is ended either with its TTL
expiration or with a replacement by a more recent validating
response. b) The records in the priority cache are basically
used for validating normal responses. When a normal response
arrives with any record conflicting with the priority cache, the
recursive resolver should not accept the response. Instead it
waits for its possible successor consistent with the priority
cache until the resolution times out. The mechanism of waiting
for genius response and denying bogus responses, used by
the caching of validating responses, is very similar to that
used by the fresh validating responses stated in the DNSSEC-
aware mode. But for the sake of maintaining strong priority
cache consistency, the recursive resolver should do more than
simply return a timeout error as a response in case of resolution
timeout.
3) Proactive Updating of Validating Response: One com-
mon concern on the Time-to-Live (TTL) based caching such as
DNS caching is the weak cache consistency. In DNS caching,
a resolver stores a record in the cache as long as specified
in that record’s TTL field. The typical setting of TTL in
DNS records ranges from 1 hour to 1 day. So the change
of DNS records in authoritative servers is usually unlikely
to be rapidly synchronized to resolvers because the resolvers
follow the TTL expiration rule to invalidate the out-of-date
cache entries and fetch the up-to-date copies upon requests.
In conventional DNS specifications, cache inconsistency only
poses a threat to the availability of Internet services because
during the cache inconsistency period, the client served with
out-to-date DNS records cannot reach the appropriate Internet
servers. In the aggressive caching use of validating response,
cache inconsistency, however, may result in a serious false
positive of genuine response. This is simply because the out-
to-date validating records in cache can deny genuine response
containing more up-to-date copies of records. When both the
genuine response and the bogus responses are invalidated by
the stale validating records in cache, a resolution timeout takes
place. So a resolution timeout may imply the possibility of
cache inconsistency of validating records (and, of course, the
possibility of authoritative server unresponsiveness or packet
loss in the network).
Thus the hold-on mechanism specified in the DNSSEC-
aware mode is slightly changed for caching of validating
response. That is, the responses inconsistent with the responses
in the priority cache are temporally hold on rather than
discarded. Because the inconsistent responses may include
the genuine response and the bogus responses in case of
cache inconsistency of validating records, they are reserved
for further validation.
To still obtain an up-to-date copy of validating record in
cache when a resolution timeout (indicating the possibility of
cache inconsistency), the resolver should proactively update
the validating record in cache by acquiring a fresh validating
response. The new validating response will has two usages:
validating the hold-on responses and then returning the vali-
dated response if any; updating the corresponding validating
records in cache. The responding process for the aggressive
use of validating response is detailed in Fig. 3.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
% The present time is initialized at an instance of
% update-triggered query
t=0; % The time is initialized as zero
T=TTL; % The residual TTL is a full TTL after an
% update-triggered query
While (){
if (T==0){ % The residual TTL decreases to zero
QUERY; % TTL-triggered query
T=TTL;}
elseif (UPDATE(t)==true){% An authoritative record
% update takes place at t
QUERY; % Update-triggered query
T=TTL;}
t=ELAPSE(t); % Time elapses
T=T-(ELAPSE(T)-T);} % The residual TTL decreases as time
% elapses
Fig. 4: Process of DNSSEC query event.
A. Query Load on the Authoritative Server
TDWN never initiates DNSSEC transactions unless possi-
ble cache poisoning attack is detected at the target resolver.
Thus for a vast majority of recursive resolvers which are not
constantly targeted by cache poisoning adversaries, TDWN
is lightweight in the name resolution cost at both recursive
resolvers and authoritative servers because DNSSEC is much
less used by TDWN than by the existing DNSSEC deployment
strategy.
Consider the case of most severe cache poisoning attack
targeting the victim resolver. That is, the attacker continuously
sends caching poisoning responses at a high rate towards the
target resolver. A DNSSEC transaction is generated by the
target resolver if and only if: 1) The validated records in the
priority cache expire so that an immediate flurry of caching
poisoning responses triggers the DNSSEC-aware mode; 2)
No validated response is found until timeout because of
the updated authoritative records. As DNSSEC is triggered
roughly either by the expiration of TTL or by the updated
authoritative records, we first investigate the event of queries
triggered by them separately. Without loss of generality, we
assume the TTL follows a probability distribution function.
If the target record is heavily requested, the times between
successive events (queries) can be approximated by the value
of TTL at the instances of events. Let the TTLs or the
successive inter-event times are independently and identically
distributed. So there is a renewal process in operation for
the TTL-triggered queries. Assume that the successive times
between the updates of authoritative records are independently
and identically distributed. So there is also a renewal process
in operation for the update-triggered queries.
However, it is not true that the two renewal processes can
be supposed to be independent renewal processes in operation
simultaneously. No matter how long the TTL elapses, the
update-triggered queries take place merely following the inter-
update times. This means the renewal process of update-
triggered queries is independent of the renewal process of
TTL-triggered queries. But the inter-event times of TTL-
triggered queries are dependent of those of update-triggered
queries. For example, if there is no update between two
successive TTL-triggered queries, their inter-time is a TTL;
if there is one update between them, the residual TTL is
renewed to a full TTL at the instance of update, and so
their inter-time is prolonged to be a full TTL plus a residual
TTL; if there is more than one updates between them, the
residual TTL is renewed more than one times, and their inter-
time becomes a full TTL plus more than one residual TTLs.
Given the dependence analyzed above, the sequence of events
of DNSSEC queries cannot be considered to be formed by
superposing the two individual processes. Instead, we depict
the process of DNSSEC queries using the code in Fig. 4.
B. Cache Poisoning Success Rate
In conventional Kaminsky cache poisoning attacks, the
attacker can balance between the number of outstanding re-
quests and the number of bogus response attempts at will to
achieve maximum efficiency. Because the number of bogus
response attempts is limited for cache poisoning attacks if
protected by the proposed scheme, the attacker has to create
more duplicate requests for the same target domains subject to
bogus response attempts in a bid to increase the probability of
successful compromise. However, the number of outstanding
requests are also bounded by two aspects in practice: 1) The
maximum number of outstanding requests is usually set as a
default configuration in most widely used authoritative server
implementations. Authoritative servers will thereby discard
excessive outstanding requests surpassing the configured limit.
So any efforts of producing over-the-limit outstanding requests
will prove fruitless. 2) The window allowed to persistently
elicit outstanding requests may be bounded by the response
time. When the resolver begins receiving a response matching
an outstanding request in the wait-for-response list, the list
will not necessarily be on the rise since then because the
responding rate may be not below the request rate. Hence a
conservative estimation of the window of outstanding requests
is the response time perceived by the target resolver. As an
equivalent of the first limit, the window can be converted to the
number of outstanding requests if the sending rate is constant.
In summary, the maximum number of outstanding requests is
the minimum of the two limits stated above.
Let the threshold of bogus response attempts be H , and
the maximum number of outstanding requests be D. We can
express the cumulative probability of cache poisoning failure
in all attempts up to and including the H th attempt as
PD(H) = P (the 1st attempt misses, the 2nd attempt
misses, ..., the H th attempt misses | D
identical outstanding queries)
(1)
If H  (I + P ) ∗N , PD(H) can be written as
PD(H) = (1−D/((I + P ) ∗N))H (2)
If no window extension mechanism is applied, the window
allocated for launching the H th attempts equals the window of
eliciting outstanding requests plus the window of validating the
responses. As analyzed above, the first is roughly the response
time and the second is also approximated as the response
time. That is, one round of cache poisoning attempt takes
two response times to obtain a success rate of 1 − PD(H).
The success rate of cache poisoning within i rounds of cache
poisoning attempt is 1− PD(H)i.
The window extension mechanism will dramatically di-
minish the success rate of cache poisoning in a given time
because one round of cache poisoning attempt with a constant
success rate of cache poisoning just lasts much longer. The
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cached validating records suppress the attacker from initiating
a new round of cache poisoning attempt immediately after the
old round proves a failure. A new window starts whenever
the validating records expires from the cache. So the length
of window is at least the TTL of the validating records.
Furthermore, the window may be prolonged to above a TTL
if updates take place before the TTL expires. In such cases,
the continuous elapse of TTL is interrupted by any update
which renews the residual TTL to a full TTL. Then the cached
validating records will still at least last a full TTL to expires
its TTL. During this period, the residual TTL may be renewed
again and again whenever a update occurs before it reaches
zero. In general, the effects of window extension are better
pronounced for a more frequent update.
V. MODEL CHECKING RESULTS
TABLE I: Parameters and their settings.
Parameter Setting
Number distinct IDs available 65536
Number of ports used (ports less than 1024 are unavailable) 64000
Number of authoritative servers for a domain 2.5
Window of opportunity 0.02 s
Number of identical outstanding queries of a resolver 20
Query sending rate from the target resolver to the authoritative servers 100 qps
Query responding rate from the authoritative servers to the target resolver 100 qps
Query sending rate from the attacker to the target resolver in order to create
the outstanding requests
1000 qps
ToD 3
Bogus responding rate from the attacker to the target resolver 100
Life cycle of validating records 10 hour
Probabilistic model checking is one of the most common
used formal verification technique for the modelling and
analysis of stochastic systems. PRISM [10] is an open-source
probabilistic model checker, providing support for building
and analyzing several types of probabilistic models. We model
Kaminsky cache poisoning attack as a continuous-time Markov
chain (CTMC) using PRISM. In modeling the attack, we
assume that in each round of cache poisoning attempt, the
queries originated from the attacker’s client look up a random
generated domain such that they will never hit the target
resolver’s cache. We also assume that the IP addresses of the
target domain’s authoritative servers are always maintained in
the cache of the target resolver. The assumption is reasonable
because the TTL of authoritative servers’ records are usually
much longer than the duration of a cache poisoning attempt.
A. Results of Query Load
To investigate the effects of combination of TTL expiration
and authoritative update on the intertime of DNSSEC queries,
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
103
104
105
106
107
The mean of update intervals
Th
e 
m
ea
n 
of
 T
TL
 e
xp
ira
tio
n 
in
te
rv
al
s
 
 
Constant TTL
Random TTL
Fig. 7: TTL expiration intervals vs authoritative update inter-
vals.
we generate a sequence of authoritative update events fol-
lowing a probabilistic distribution while setting the TTLs in
the DNSSEC responses as constant and probabilistic values
respectively. In one set of experiments, we let the TTLs of
records in question be evenly distributed on the interval from
500s to 1500s. In the other set of experiments, the TTLs
of records in question take a constant value as 1000s. For
both sets of experiments, the intertime of authoritative updates
follows exponential distribution with the parameter ranging
from 100s to 1400s.
We use Monte Carlo method to estimate the mean of inter-
times of DNSSEC queries. In each experiment, 100,000 times
of authoritative updates are generated from an exponential
distribution. A number of TTLs, taking either constant values
or probabilistic values, are also produced to cover the same
time span at the instances when the predecessor TTL expires
or authoritative update takes place.
Fig. 5 illustrates how DNSSEC query intervals change with
authoritative update intervals. We can see that a very small
authoritative update interval has almost the same DNSSEC
query interval because TTL expiration rarely happens. But for
a larger authoritative update interval, the limiting effect of TTL
is better pronounced because a TTL has more chance of being
smaller than an authoritative update interval thus more chance
of expiration. Random TTLs, though have the same mean
as constant TTLs, tend to cause a slightly larger DNSSEC
query intervals and thereby a smaller DNSSEC query load
on authoritative servers. The ratio of TTL-triggered queries is
illustrated in Fig. 6. We can see that the ratio of TTL-triggered
queries grows as the mean of update intervals increases. But
the authoritative update tends to pronounce more than TTL
expiration on triggering DNSSEC queries even if they share
the same mean interval. As shown in Fig. 7, when both
update interval and TTL take a mean of 1000s, TTL-triggered
DNSSEC queries only account for about 36% of the total. That
can be explained by the fact that the event of authoritative
update is independent of and never superceded by the event of
TTL expiration while the even arrival of TTL expiration may
be interrupted and restarted by an authoritative update.
It is obvious that DNSSEC query interval will be larger if
authoritative update and TTL expiration are independent. So in
order to examine the lower bound of DNSSEC query interval
or the upper bound of DNSSEC query rate, we assume that
authoritative update and TTL expiration are independent. Then
the mean DNSSEC query interval can be written as
Ioverall =
Iupdate ∗ Ittl
Iupdate + Ittl
(3)
Where Iupdate and Ittl represent the authoritative update
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Fig. 8: Time needed for a 50%
success rate vs life cycle of
validating records (ToD=3).
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Fig. 9: Time needed for a 50%
success rate vs life cycle of
validating records (ToD=2).
interval and the TTL respectively.
As can be seen from Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, we can conclude that
the maximum DNSSEC query rate of TDWN under intense
cache poisoning attempts is of the same order as the minimum
of the authoritative record update rate and the reciprocal of
TTL.
B. Results of Cache Poisoning Success Rate
We configure the default values in Tab. 1 for the parameters
in the model checking unless their values are otherwise stated.
First, we illustrate the time needed for a 50% success
rate under different life cycle of validating records in Fig. 8
(ToD=3). We can see that the time cost of cache poisoning
roughly grows linearly with the life cycle of validating records.
For a life cycle above 10 hours, the time required for a 50%
success rate amounts to no less than 2 years. This is because
the longer are the validating records provided in cache to
defend against cache poisoning attacks, the longer does an
attacker have to wait to embark the next cache poisoning
attempt (if the current attempt fails). As the TTLs of many
authoritative records are set in the order of days or even
weeks, it is very hard in practice to compromise them through
cache poisoning attacks. Fig. 8 also shows creating more
outstanding queries may dramatically decrease the difficulty
of cache poisoning. Thus in the defense, the resolver should
not allow excessive identical outstanding queries in order to
prevent an unacceptable success rate of cache poisoning.
Second, we investigate the impacts of ToD on the success
rate. In Fig. 9, the time needed for a 50% success rate is
shown when the ToD is lowered to 2. We can see that limiting
ToD helps significantly to suppress the success rate of cache
poisoning. Since ToD defines the maximum number of forgery
responses (ToD-1) allowed without defense, a larger ToD
means more chance of guessing attempts in a cache poisoning
attempt thus a larger success rate. To ensure the efficacy of
TDWN, ToD should be set as a sound small value.
Third, we study how the cache poisoning success rate
evolves over time. In Fig. 10, we can see that the success
rate over time grows like a stair-step shape. In the curve, each
step virtually represents a cache poisoning attempt in time and
an accumulation of ToD-1 forgery responses in success rate.
And the width of each stair-step is dominated by the life cycle
of validating response. When ToD is three in Fig. 10, there are
two forgery responses aggregated in a cache poisoning attempt
to increase the overall success rate.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
x 10−3
Time (in hour)
Ca
ch
e 
po
iso
ni
ng
 s
uc
ce
ss
 ra
te
Fig. 10: Cache poisoning suc-
cess rate vs time (ToD=3).
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10−3
Time (in hour)
Ca
ch
e 
po
iso
ni
ng
 s
uc
ce
ss
 ra
te
Fig. 11: Cache poisoning suc-
cess rate vs time (ToD=5).
Fourth, how the setting of ToD impacts the cache poisoning
success rate is studied. As illustrated in Fig. 11, the increase
of ToD from 3 to 5 will lessen the defense of TWND against
cache poisoning attacks. While the width of each stair-step
stays the same as Fig. 10, the jump of each stair-step in the
success rate is doubled. So the overall success rate grows much
faster than Fig. 10. This shows again that a large ToD may
undermine the defense capability of TWND.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
DNSSEC deployment suffers from its significant costs
which in turn slow its progess. The resulting long transition
to DNSSEC leaves a large name space still vulnerable to
cache poisoning attacks. To speed up DNSSEC adoption and
thereby narrow the window of transitional risks, a lightweight
DNSSEC solution was proposed. The attack detection per-
formed by recursive resolvers is employed to take up DNSSEC
on demand rather than incessantly. The lightly used DNSSEC
not only greatly lowers the DNSSEC overheads but also
basically reserves the DNSSEC defense capability against
cache poisoning attacks.
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